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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 20010514-CA

VICTOR MANUAL RODRIGUEZ,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction entered pursuant to an unconditional guilty plea
to possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) (Supp. 2001). This Court has
original appellate jurisdiction over appeals from convictions for second degree felonies.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the validity of defendant's guilty plea
where he did not file a timely motion to withdraw his plea?
Standard of Review: Because this issue was not presented to the trial court, there is
no applicable standard of review. However, whether a court has jurisdiction presents a pure
legal question. See State v. One 1980 Cadillac, 2001 UT 26,1J 8, 21 P.3d 212.
1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999)
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2)

(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion and shall be made within 30 days after entry of the plea.

(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under rule 65B,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Defendant, an illegal alien, was arrested when police discovered 37 balloons
containing cocaine and heroin in his mouth. See Information at 2; PH:7.
An information, filed on 25 January 2001, charged defendant with two counts of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, both second degree felonies.
See Information. On 27 March 2001, defendant pled guilty to the first count in exchange for
the dismissal of the second. See PH:10-11.

^ h e record in this case has not been paginated. Record cites to the pleadings file
will therefore be to the title of the document and the internal page number, where
applicable. There are only two transcript volumes: the plea hearing and the sentencing
hearing. Citations to the plea hearing transcript will appear as "PH" followed by the
internal page number, e.g., PH:3. Citations to the sentencing hearing will appear as %4SFF
followed by the internal page number, e.g., SH:5.
2

Plea Hearing
Defendant was represented by counsel at the plea hearing. PH:2. A certified court
Spanish interpreter translated the proceedings for defendant. PH:2-3, 5-6. Before accepting
defendant's plea, the trial court ascertained through a colloquy that defendant understood the
charges against him and that he was giving up several constitutional rights by pleading guilty,
including the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, the right to call and cross-examine
witnesses, the presumption of innocence, and the right to have the State prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. PH:7-8. Defendant told the trial court he had discussed his
constitutional rights with his attorney and that he was satisfied with counsel's representation.
PH:5. Defendant's attorney also represented to the court that he had discussed defendant's
constitutional rights with him and that counsel believed defendant understood what he was
waiving by pleading guilty. PH:7.
The trial court explained that defendant's right to appeal a guilty plea was "very
limited," and that by pleading guilty to a second degree felony, he risked a prison sentence
of one-to-fifteen years, a $10,000 fine, and an 85 per cent surcharge. PH:8-10. The trial
court then stated its intent to order a presentence report and explained that the sentencing
judge would be "the person who determines the type of sentence you will receive." PH:9.
The prosecutor interposed, stating he understood the matter to be a simple "plead and
deport" and that a presentence report was unnecessary "because our recommendation is that
he spend 30 days and be deported." PH:9. Defense counsel, however, insisted that a

3

presentence report be prepared before sentencing. Id. Turning to defendant, the trial court
said,
Mr. Rodriguez, it's been brought to my attention that part of the
recommendation will be that at sentencing you will be permitted to be deported
from the United States. That's not something I am going to address today, but,
certainly, it is something that the sentencing judge will address. Your
obligation is to come back to court for that sentencing. You are aware of that;
are you not?
PH:10. Defendant replied he understood. Id.
Defendant confirmed that no one had threatened or forced him to plead guilty and that
no promises had been made to him, other than dismissal of the second count. PH:10. The
trial court then witnessed defendant sign a statement, written in both Spanish and English,
affirming that defendant understood the charges and all the constitutional rights he was
waiving by pleading guilty. Id.; see also Statement of Defendant, reproduced in Addendum
A. The written statement included all the advisements required by rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. See Utah R. Crim. Pro. 1 l(e-g).
Defendant's counsel also signed the statement, certifying that defendant had read the
statement or had it read to him, that counsel had discussed the statement with defendant, and
that counsel believed defendant fully understood its contents. Add. A. The prosecutor and
trial court also signed the statement, and the trial court expressly incorporated the written
statement into the court record. PH: 11.
The trial court told defendant he had 30 days in which to file a motion to withdraw
his plea. PH:11.

4

Sentencing Hearing
Defendant was sentenced on 18 May 2001. See Minutes - Sentence, Judgment,
Commitment. The presentence report ("PSF) recommended the statutory prison sentence
and that prior to his release, defendant be referred to INS for deportation. PSI at 10. The PS I
rejected probation as a viable option given defendant's illegal status in the United States. Id.
at 9.
Defendant's counsel asked the trial court not to impose the recommended prison time:
When we talked about plea negotiations, what we spoke about,
although there was no specific commitment to it - Mr. Rodriguez knows that
he's going to be subject to deportation. We discussed the possibility of a
nominal amount of local time and an immediate deportation, which he would
not resist. And, Your Honor, I would submit that rather than the prison that's
recommended by the Presentence Report, under these circumstances, given the
total absence of criminal history in this young man's past, that local jail and
deportation would be appropriate. And we'd ask the Court to impose that
sentence.
SH:4 (emphasis added). The prosecutor made no recommendations because he had not yet
seen the presentence report and could not "speak intelligently to it." SH:4. The prosecutor,
therefore "[left] it to the Court's discretion and submitted] it on the basis of the report
without having seen it." SH:4.
The sentencing court, "astounded" that defendant "had 37 balloons of dope in [his]
mouth," imposed the statutory prison term of one-to-fifteen years with the proviso that he be
deported once he served his time. SH:5. At no time during the sentencing hearing did
defendant or his counsel allege that the prosecutor had promised to make any specific
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recommendations or that defendant believed that the tnal court would be bound by any
recommendations.
Defendant obtained new counsel and, within 30 days of sentencing, filed a notice of
appeal on 12 June 2001. See Notice of Appeal, reproduced in Addendum B. On 6 July
2001, defendant filed an application for certificate of probable cause with the district court.
See Application for Certificate of Probable Cause. In his application, defendant argued that
he had a substantial likelihood of succeeding on appeal for essentially the same reasons
contained in his brief. See id.; Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Application
for Certificate of Probable Cause.
According to an unsigned minute entry, the trial court held oral argument on the
application for probable cause and denied it. See Minutes - Law & Motion, dated 17 October
2001. That minute entry also states that oral argument was heard on a "motion to set aside
guilty plea," and that the motion was denied. Id. No written motion to set aside or to
withdraw the guilty plea appears in the record, nor does the transcript of the hearing on
defendant's application for a certificate of probable cause.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By statute, a defendant's right to move to withdraw a guilty plea is limited to thirty
days after entry of the plea. The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that a plea is entered
for purposes of a motion to withdraw at the time defendant's sentence is entered. Failure to
file a timely motion to withdraw a plea in the district court "extinguishes a defendant's right
to challenge the validity of the guilty plea on appeal," and therefore deprives the appellate
6

court of jurisdiction to review such a challenge. State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, *| 3, 439 Utah
Adv. Rep. 28. Because defendant, by his own concession, did not file a timely motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the validity of his
plea. The plain error doctrine, an exception to the preservation rule, cannot confer
jurisdiction on this Court where none exists. Defendant has waived his constitutional
challenge to the 30-day limitations period. In any event, he has not shown how the 30-day
limitations period is unconstitutional under either the federal or state constitutions.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE VALIDITY
OF DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE HE DID NOT FILE A
TIMELY MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA IN DISTRICT
COURT; DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN HOW THE STATUTORY
TIME PERIOD FOR FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A PLEA IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Defendant asks this Court to set aside his guilty plea on two grounds: (1) the trial
court did not strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in taking his
plea, Br. Aplt. at 9-20; and (2) his plea was not knowing or voluntary because he was "either
led to believe or at a minimum, was allowed to believe he would only serve thirty days [and]
then be deported." Br. Aplt. at 22-23. Defendant acknowledges that he did not file a timely
motion to withdraw his plea with the trial court, but contends that this Court may
nevertheless review the validity of his plea for plain error. Br. Aplt. 8-9. Alternatively,
defendant challenges the constitutionality of the statutory 30-day time limit for moving to
withdraw a guilty plea.

7

As explained below, absent a timely motion to w ithdraw a guilty plea, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to review the validity of that plea, even for plain error. Defendant waived his
constitutional claim by not raising it below.

Even if defendant had preserved his

constitutional challenge, he has not shown how the statutory 30-day limitations period
violates any federal or state constitutional provision.
A.

Under recent controlling precedent this Court lacks jurisdiction to review
defendant's guilty plea.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (1999) provides that a guilty plea may be withdrawn

only upon a showing of good cause. A request to withdraw a guilty plea must be "made by
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea." Id. This Court held in
State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 581-82 (Utah App. 1992), that the statutory 30 days ran from
the date of the plea hearing in which the court accepted the defendant's plea. The Price court
also held that so long as the defendant was informed of it, the 30-day limitations period was
jurisdictional. Id. at 583-84. In other words, failure to file a timely motion to withdraw a
guilty plea deprived both the trial court and the appellate court ofjurisdiction to entertain that
motion.

Id.

A year later, the Utah Supreme Court implicitly agreed with Price's

jurisdictional ruling when it held that the statutory period limited "a defendant's right to
withdraw his or her guilty plea to thirty days after entry of the plea," and thereafter
"extinguished]" the right. State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993).
In State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, H 8, 996 P.2d 1065 {Ostler I), this Court held that
although the 30-day limitations period was jurisdictional, and although the defendant there
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had not timely moved to withdraw his plea, it could nevertheless review the validity of the
guilty plea for plain error or exceptional circumstances. The Utah Supreme Court granted
certiorari review and overruled Price's holding that the 30-day limitations period ran from
the date of the plea colloquy. State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68,111, 31 ?-3d 528 {Ostler II). The
Ostler II Court instead held that a plea was not entered until entry of the final judgment of
conviction, and that the 30-day statutory period therefore ran from the date of sentencing.
Id. at H 8-11. Because Ostler had filed a motion to withdraw his plea within 30 days after
sentencing, his motion was timely and the supreme court affirmed Ostler /"only as to result,
without comment on its [plain error] analysis." Id. at ^j 13. The Ostler IIopinion, however,
compared the statutory 30-day limitation period to the 30-day time limit for filing a notice
of appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari under rules 4 and 48, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, both considered to be jurisdictional time bars. Id. at 11 n.3. See also Price, 837
P.2d at 582-83 (also comparing the statutory limitations period to those contained in rules 4
and 48).
In State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392,ffl[7,436 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, on which defendant
relies, this Court concluded that since Ostler I had not been "clearly overruled by Ostler //,"
it could still review "a plain error claim based on a violation of Rule 11," even though the
defendant had never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This Court observed,
however, that "[g]iven the supreme court's references to Rules 4 and 48 [in Ostler //], the
plain error exception recognized in Ostler I may surely be questioned/' Melo, 2001 UT App
392.1[5,n.4.
•

9

After defendant filed his brief, the Utah Supreme Court issued State v. Reyes, 2002
UT 13,439 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, and explicitly stated what was implicit in Ostler II. (A copy
of Reyes is contained in Addendum C). The Reyes Court held that it did not have
jurisdiction to address defendant's challenge to the validity of his guilty plea because
defendant had not filed a timely motion to withdraw his plea. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, If 3. The
Court explained that the failure to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea within the statutory
30-day period "extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea
on appeal." Id. (citing to State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993,995 (Utah 1993); Ostler II, 2001 UT
68, If 10; State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993)).
Reyes argued, as defendant does here, that the Court could nevertheless review his
guilty plea if plain error or exceptional circumstances existed. Reyes, at 1f 4. The supreme
court categorically rejected that argument, explaining that while an appellate court "may
choose to review an issue not properly preserved for plain error," it could not "use plain error
to reach an issue over which it has no jurisdiction." Id.
Reyes is dispositive. Defendant concedes that he did not file a timely motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.2 Like Reyes, he argues only that this Court may still review his
challenge to the validity of his guilty plea for plain error. Br. Aplt. 8-9, 14-15, 20-21, 23-24,

2

As noted above, the record suggests that after filing his notice of appeal,
defendant at one point made an oral motion to set aside his guilty plea, which the trial
court denied in an unsigned minute entry on 17 October 2001. See Minutes - Law &
Motion, dated 17 October 2001. Defendant does not mention making this motion nor
does he claim that it amounted to a timely motion to withdraw his plea.
10

25-26. As Reyes explained, however, plain error is nothing more than an exception to the
preservation rule which prevents an appellate court from reaching an issue not raised in the
trial court. Reyes, at % 4; see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1j 12, 10 P.3d 346 (general
preservation rule, that claims not raised in trial court may not be raised on appeal, applies to
every claim, unless a defendant can show that "exceptional circumstances" exist or that
"plain error" occurred). As such, plain error cannot be used to cure a jurisdictional defect.
Reyes, at ^ 4.3
Defendant nevertheless suggests that his appeal "is in essence a motion to withdraw
[his] guilty plea," filed in the appellate court. Br. Aplt. 28. To the extent defendant is asking
this Court to treat his notice of appeal as a timely motion to withdraw his plea, he has
presented no factual or legal basis for this Court to do so. Nothing in the notice of appeal
suggests that it is anything different than its caption indicates. It does not state, or even
imply, that defendant seeks to withdraw his plea or that good cause exists for allowing him

3

Defendant has only sought review of his guilty plea for plain error and has not
argued that he is entitled to appellate review under the "exceptional circumstances"
doctrine. See Br. Aplt. 8-9, 14-15, 20-21, 23-24, 25-26. Even if defendant had argued
exceptional circumstances, the analysis in Reyes would still preclude review of the
validity of defendant's plea. Exceptional circumstances, like plain error, is no more than
an exception to the preservation rule, and therefore cannot be used to cure a jurisdictional
defect. Cf. Reyes, at K 4; State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231-32 (Utah App. 1991)
(finding exceptional circumstances excused defendant's fa ilure to raise a claimed error
at the trial level where then-existing case law would have made raising the issue futile).
Other than Ostler I, which Reyes has now effectively overruled, the State could find no
case in which a Utah appellate court used plain error, exceptional circumstances, or any
other exception to the preservation rule to reach an issue over which it did not have
jurisdiction.
11

to do so. To treat defendant's notice of appeal as a properly and timely filed motion to
withdraw his guilty plea would be nothing more than to improperly circumvent the
jurisdictional requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 and Reyes. Furthermore,
it is telling that defendant concedes he never filed a motion to withdraw his plea, therebyacknowledging that his notice of appeal was only what it purported to be - a notice of appeal.
Even if defendant's notice of appeal could somehow be construed as a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, it would not be for this Court to rule on that motion. Rather, it would be for
the district court to grant or deny it. See Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343-45 (Utah App.
1988) (the two ways to attack a guilty plea are (1) directly, in context of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea, the denial of which may be appealed, or (2) collaterally, through a
post-conviction petition).
In sum, under Reyes, this Court lacks jurisdiction to address the validity of defendant's
guilty plea where, by his own admission, he has not filed a timely motion to withdraw his
pica. Plain error, an exception to the preservation rule, cannot confer jurisdiction where there
is none.
B.

Defendant waived his constitutional challenge to the 30-day limitations period;
in any event he has not shown the limitation period is unconstitutional.
For the first time on appeal, defendant alternatively argues that the "portion of the

statute [Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b)] limiting the time to withdraw a guilty plea to thirty
days from the date of the plea should be found unconstitutional." Br. Aplt. 26 (emphasis
added).

Defendant contends that this aspect of the statute violates his right to equal
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protection and due process under both the federal and state constitutions because "a
defendant may discover errors only after it is too late to remedy the problem." Br. Aplt. 26.
Defendant compares the 30-day limitations period to a statute of repose because it cut off his
right to move to withdraw before he could discover the alleged defect in his plea. Id.
As a general rule, a defendant is barred from raising an issue, even constitutional
questions, for the first time on appeal. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah 1993); State
v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). "An appellate court may address a
constitutional issue for the first time on appeal if: (1) the trial court committed 'plain error;'
or (2) there are 'exceptional circumstances.'" Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922. What
constitutes "exceptional circumstances" has not be well-defined by case law, however, the
doctrine has been described as "a safety device to make certain that manifest injustice does
not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal." Id. at 923.
Defendant argues that exceptional circumstances excuse his failure to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute below because of a "rare procedural anomaly" created by thenexisting case law. Br. Aplt. 27-28. Defendant essentially argues that he could not have filed
a timely motion to withdraw his plea because he could not have known of any of the alleged
defects in his plea until sentencing, which occurred more than 30 days after the plea hearing
- the date from which the 30-days ran under both Price and Ostler I. Br. Aplt. 26-27.
Defendant claims that the trial judge's warning that he had only 30 days from the date of the
plea hearing to withdraw his plea, in conjunction with then-existing case law, "tricked,
bamboozled, led [him] astray and induced" him to forego filing a motion to withdraw his plea
13

and to instead simply file a notice of appeal. Defendant asserts that had he known Ostler II
would have permitted him to file a motion to w ithdraw his plea within 30 days of sentencing,
he would have done so. Br. Aplt. 27.
Defendant's assertions, however, do not present any exceptional circumstances that
warrant this Court addressing the constitutionality of the 30-day limitation period for the first
time on appeal. Contrary to defendant's assertions, nothing in the trial court's advisement
or then-existing case law prevented him from raising his constitutional argument below.
As a preliminary matter, defendant need not resort to his constitutional challenge with
respect to his claims that the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11 because those
claims should have been at least as apparent to him as he now claims it should have been to
the trial court. Certainly, he could and should have discovered any alleged rule 11 violations
within 30 days of the plea hearing. Thus, irrespective of Ostler /, he was on notice that he
only had 30 days from the plea hearing to move to withdraw his plea. If he had done so, his
motion would have been timely under both Ostler I and Ostler II*

4

In making this argument, the State does not concede that the trial court did not
strictly comply with rule 11. A review of the colloquy as well as the written statement
demonstrates that in fact the trial court strictly complied with rule 11. See State v.
Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1992) (plea affidavits properly incorporated into the
record may be used to demonstrate strict rule 11 compliance); see also State v. Penman,
964 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Utah App. 1998) (resorting to defendant's written statements in
addition to court's colloquy to determine strict rule 11 compliance). Defendant seeks to
avoid the thoroughness of the written statement he signed in open court by arguing the
trial court had not properly incorporated into the record. Br. Aplt. 9-15. The record
refutes that claim. The trial court asked defendant if he had discussed his rights with his
attorney, recessed so that defendant could have additional discussions with his attorney,
and specifically referred to the statement before defendant signed it. PH:4-8, 10-11. The
14

Thus, defendant's constitutional challenge only goes to his claim that his plea
was rendered unknowing or involuntary at sentencing when he allegedly discovered that the
sentencing court was not bound by any recommendations. Defendant contends that he could
not have discovered this claim before sentencing and that by the time he did, the 30 days had
run and effectively extinguished his claim under then-existing case law. But even assuming
the truth of defendant's assertion, he was not precluded from arguing to the trial court that
the 30-day limitations period was unconstitutional. Once defendant believed that his plea
had been rendered unknowing or involuntary, it behooved him to file a motion to withdraw
his plea and to argue to the district court that running the 30-day period from the plea hearing
was unconstitutional under the circumstances. If the district court denied his motion to
withdraw, defendant could have then appealed and advanced his preserved constitutional
claim to this Court.
Defendant's comparison of his situation to a statute of repose only illustrates this
point. See Br. Aplt. 26-27'. A statute of repose is a limitations period that sometimes has the
effect of cutting off an injured party's cause of action before it even arises. Craftsman

statement was in both English and Spanish, and stated that defendant understood its
contents. See Add. A. Defendant's attorney also signed the statement certifying that
defendant had read it or had it read him, that they had discussed it, and defendant
understood its contents. Id. The trial court then expressly stated on the record that it was
incorporating the written statement into the record. PH: 11. Under the circumstances,
there can be no question that the written statement was properly incorporated into the
record and should therefore be considered in determining strict rule 11 compliance. See
Penman, 964 P.2d at 1161 (holding plea affidavit properly incorporated into record under
similar circumstances).
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Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Manufacturing Co., 1999 UT 18, *{\ 14, 974 P.2d 1194; Lee
v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 576 (Utah 1993). Under certain circumstances, a statute of repose
may be unconstitutional under our state constitution. See, e.g., Sun Valley Water Beds of
Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 191-92 (Utah 1989). However, if a
plaintiff wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a statute of repose that has cut off a
cause of action, he must first file the action and present his constitutional claim to the trial
court. If the trial court then dismisses the cause of action as barred by the statute of repose,
the plaintiff may appeal that dismissal and advance his preserved constitutional claim to the
appellate court. See Stoker v. Workers'Comp. Fund of Utah, 889 P.2d409,411 (Utah 1994)
(addressing plaintiffs constitutional challenge to statute of repose, but declining to address
other constitutional claims not raised before the trial court); see also Craftsman Builder's
Supply, Inc., 1999 UT 18, ^ 8 (appellant arguing constitutionality of statute of repose had
made that argument below).
Thus, the fact that the time for filing a motion to withdraw a plea had already run
under then-existing case law, did not create a "rare procedural anomaly" that precluded
defendant from first presenting his constitutional claim to the district court.
Nor could Ostler I have misled defendant into believing that he did not need to file
a motion to withdraw or make his constitutional argument to the trial court. As this Court
explained in Melo, the plain error review permitted in Ostler /applied only to claims based
on a violation of rule 11, not claims, such as defendant's, that he was induced to plead guilt)
based on his misunderstanding of the likely outcome at sentencing. Melo, 2001 UT App 392,
16

^ 7-8; see also State v. Parnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d 1222 (reaching defendant's
plain error claim based on violations of rule 11, but refusing to extend Ostler I to provide
plain error review of other legal challenges to a guilty plea).'
In sum, defendant's failure to file a motion to withdraw his plea does not present any
exceptional circumstance that excuses his failure to raise his constitutional claim in the trial
court. Rather, defendant simply did not follow the correct procedure for placing his
arguments before this Court.
In any event, defendant's contention that the statute is unconstitutional insofar as it
limits the time to withdraw a guilty plea to 30 days "from the date of the plea," is moot.
Ostler //specifically interpreted the statutory phrase "within 30 days after entry of the plea"
to mean within 30 days after entry of the judgment at sentencing. Ostler II, 2001 UT 68,1ft[
8-11. Because the statute does not limit the time to 30 days after the plea hearing, it cannot
be unconstitutional for that reason.
More important, defendant has not explained how or why the 30-day limitations
period is unconstitutional. He merely baldly asserts that the time limitation violates the equal

"Significantly, Ostler himself did not simply appeal his guilty plea; rather, he filed
a motion to withdraw his plea within 30 days after sentencing, which under then-existing
caselaw was untimely. Ostler II, 2001 UT 68, \ 2; Ostler /, 2000 UT App 28,ffif7-8.
Ostler appealed from the denial of that motion and, on appeal, challenged Price's holding
that the 30-day limitations period was jurisdictional and ran from the date of the plea
hearing. Id. That challenge ultimately led to Ostler IPs holding that the 30-days ran from
the date of sentencing and that his motion to withdraw was in fact timely. Ostler IP at Ifll
11-12. As explained, defendant also could have moved to withdraw his plea in distnct
court. If his motion had been dismissed as untimely, he, like Ostler, could have then
challenged the limitation period as unconstitutional.
17

protection and due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions because "a defendant
may discover errors only after it is too late to remedy the problem/* Br. Aplt. 26. Defendant
cites to no authority other than Ostler II to support his assertion, nor does he engage in any
meaningful legal analysis. Br. Aplt. 26-27'. Defendant's failure to adequately brief this claim
is an alternative basis for not addressing it for the first time on appeal. See Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9) (requiring appellant's brief to include "contentions and reasons . . . with respect to
the issues presented . . . with citations to authorities, statutes, and parts of record relied on");
Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 1996) (declining to review issue not
adequately bnefed); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (same). 6

6

Defendant does not argue that the statutory 30-day limitations period is
unconstitutional when run from the date of sentencing, as held by Ostler II. Such an
argument would necessarily fail because defendant has another adequate, statutory means
for obtaining review of the validity of his guilty plea. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(3)
provides that the 30-day limitations period "does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned
person under rule 65[C], Utah Rules of Civil Procedure," which provides the procedure
for obtaining post-conviction relief. The crux of defendant's claim on appeal is that his
plea was not knowing or voluntary because he was led to believe that the prosecutor
would recommend that he spend 30 days in jail and then be deported, and that the
sentencing court would be bound by that recommendation. Br. Aplt.21 -27. Defendant
may file a petition for post-conviction relief in the district court seeking to set aside his
guilty on that basis. See Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991-92 (Utah 1993) (postconviction relief will lie if petitioner shows that guilt plea was in fact not knowing and
voluntary); Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343-34 (Utah App. 1988) (explaining that
guilty pleas may be collaterally attacked in post-conviction proceeding where a defendant
did not move to withdraw guilty plea). If the district court denies his petition, he may
then seek appellate review of that denial. Thus, the 30-day limitations period does not
work a substantial injustice in this case nor does it deprive defendant of due process or
equal protection.
18

CONCLUSION
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the validity of defendant's guilty plea.
Defendant has waived his constitutional claim and, in any event, has not shown that the
statutory limitation period for moving to withdraw a guilty plea is unconstitutional. The
Court should therefore dismiss defendant's appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ f ^ d a v of F&kr».corof , 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL
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/LAURA B. DUPAIX
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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ADDENDUMA
Defendant's Written Plea Statement

IN THE DISTRIC T COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL UlSTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
EN EL TRIBUNAL JUDICIAL DEL TERCER DISTRITO
CONDADO DE SALT LAKE. ESTADO DE UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
EL ESTADO DE UTAH,
Plaintiff,
El Demandante,

CASE NO- OH (JQI

versus
contra

//VV?9,<

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT.
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER
EL DOCUMENTO DECLARATAORIO DEL
ACUSADO. LOS CERTIFICADOS DE LOS
ABOGADOS Y LA ORDEN DEL JUEZ

7.7^

N° DE CASO

/Wrfl/l<ti-Aj)fr&df2?

Defendant
El Acusado

COMES NOW \jl i-^^f
f/$ //£/f-rt<(s-'2rthe defendant in this case, and hereby
acknowledges and certifies the following: .,
COMPARECE \fJ Q-Jpfi^c'tfCf
!£//£&
acusado en este caso. y por este medio
reconoce v certifica lo sisuiente:
I am entering a plea of guilty to the following crime(s):
Me declaro culpable del siguiente delito(s):
CRIME & STATUTORY
PROVISION

DEGREE

EL DELITO Y LA DISPOSICION
ESTABLECIDA POR LA LEY

GRADO

fir te>firAf>/ifQ StGffnt'-^
B.

c.

PUNISHMENT
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
EL CASTIGO
Minimo, maximo y/o
minirno
nimc oblisatorio

I have received a copy of the Information against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature
and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading guilty.
He recibido una copia del Documento Acusatono, la he leido, y entiendo la naturaleza y los elementos
del delito(s) por el cual me declaro culpable.
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows:
Los elementos del delito(s) del cual se me acusa son los siguientes:

r^j f£/hfcitr

f-fc-i'/j

-/ L J
jf\^^*~*~
"**"

'^^^r^^^c/

£<f/fAfQ/ft^frs&fjt'i/?-

farm / jjrujfr T?> pjsr/Zj&lh^

9/^ti £J*&$-^^

My conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable that constitutes
the elements of the crime(s) charged is as follows:
Mi conducta y la conducta de otras personas por la cual soy penalmente responsable, y que constitute
los elementos del delito(s) imputado. es la siguiente:

I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the
following facts:
Doy entrada a esta declaracion(es) voluntariamente y con el conocimiento y el entendimiento de la
siguiente informacion:
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one,
an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize that a condition of my sentence
may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so
appointed for me.
1. Se que tengo el derecho a ser representado por un abogado. y si no tengo los fondos para contratar
uno. el tribunal me asignara un abogado sin cobrarme. Reconozco que una condicion de nu pena puede ser que
^e me requiera pagar una cantidad. determinada por el tribunal, para reembolsar el costo del abogado. si es que
se me asignara uno.
2. I (have not) (ham,) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have
done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:
2. (No he) (he) renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado. Si he renunciado al derecho a tener un
abogado, lo he hecho a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente por las siguientes razones:

.

3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and understand the nature
and elements of the charges, my rights in this case and other proceedings, and the consequences of my
plea of guilty.
3 Si he renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado, he lefdo este documento y entiendo la naturaleza
y los elementos de los cargos, mis derechos en este ca^o y otros actos procesales, y las consecuenuas de mi
declaracion de culpabihdad
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is
have had an opportunity to fully discuss this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty
plea with my attorney.
o
t - )s\
p<;
]
4 Si no he renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado, mi abogado £ff!\TC frj I ^/Tlffih™
y he tenido la oportunidad de hablar con mi abogado en detalle sobre este documento, mis derechos v las
consecuenciab de mi declaracion de culpabihdad
5. I know that I have a right to a speedy trial in open court by an impartial jury and that I am
giving up that right by pleading guilty.
5 Se que tengo el derecho a tener un juicio publico sin demora ante un jurado imparcial > que al
declararme culpable renuncio a ese derecho
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to compel
my witness!es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court in my behalf. I understand that I am
giving up these rights if I plead guilty.
6 Se que si deseo tener un juicio, tengo ei derecho a carear y repreguntar a los testigos en mi contra
o hacer que mi abogado les repregunte. Tambien se que tengo el derecho a obligar a mis, testigo(s) per medio
de un citatono costeado por el Estado, a testificar a mi tavor en el tribunal Entiendo que al declararme culpable
renuncio a estos derechos
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf; but if I choose not to do so, I cannot
be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself; and no adverse inferences will be drawn against
me if I do not testify. I understand that I am giving up these rights if I plead guilty.
7 Se que tengo el derecho a testificar a mi tavor pero si ehjo no hacerlo. no se me puede obligar
a testificar o a dar pruebas en mi contra, y ninguna inierenua destavorabie se sacara en mi contra si no tesufico
Entiendo que al declararme culpable renuncio a estos derechos
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and the
matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State of Ltah will have the burden of proving each element
of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous.
8 Se que ^i deseo disputar la acusacion, solo necesito declararme inocente y el asunto se rijara para
un juicio En el juicio el Estado de Utah tendra la obltgaaon de probar cada elemento de la acusacion sin que
quepa duda razanoble Si el juicio es ante un jurado el veredicto tiene que ser unanime

9. I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the right of a presumption of innocence. I
understand that I am presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if
this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead guilty. I understand that I give up the right to the presumption
of innocence if I plead guilty.
9. Entiendo que como acusado gozo del derecho a la presuncion de inocencia. Entiendo que se supone
que soy inocente hasta que el Estado pruebe en un juicio ante un jurado que soy culpable sin que quepa duda
razonable, o hasta que me declare culpable si decido no tener un juicio. Entiendo que renuncio al derecho a la
presuncion de inocencia si me declaro culpable.
10. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the
Judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or,
where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal,
those costs would be paid by the State. I understand that I am giving up these rights if I plead guilty.
10. Se que bajo la Constitucion de Utah, si el jurado o el Juez me enjuiciara y condenara, tendna el
derecho a apelar mi condena y pena en la Corte de Apelaciones de Utah o, donde se permita. en la Corte
Suprema de Utah, y si no tuviera los fondos para pagar por los gastos de tal apelacion, esos gastos los pagaria
el Estado. Entiendo que renuncio a estos derechos si me declaro culpable.
11. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which I plead guilty.
I know that by pleading guilty to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence, I will be
subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentence
may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine, an
eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to
make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges
that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this plea agreement.
11. Se cual es la pena maxima que se puede imponer por cada delito por el cual me declaro culpable.
Se que al declararme culpable de un delito que lleva una pena minima obligatoria. me estare someuendo a
cumplir esa pena minima obligatona por ese delito. Se que las penas pueden ser consecutivas v pueden consistir
en una condena penitenciana. una multa, o ambas. Se que ademas de una multa. se impondra un recargo de
ochenta y cinco por ciento (85%). Tambien se que el Juez me puede ordenar indemnizar a cualquier \ ictimai s)
de mis delitos, incluyendo cualquier restitution que se deba en los cargos retirados como resultado de este
convenio declaratorio. si estos existieran.
12. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for an additional
amount if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I pled guilty, my
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
12. Se que el encarcelamiento puede ser por penodos consecutivos. o la multa en una cantidad
adicional. si me declaro culpable de mas de un delito. Tambien se que si estoy bajo libertad conditional
probatona ("probation"), o libertad preparatory ("parole"), o esperando la imposition de la pena por otro deiito
del cual he sido condenado o por el cual me he declarado culpable, mi declaration de culpabilidad en la presente
action puede resultar en que se me impongan penas consecuti\as.
13. I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up my statutory
and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such pleais),
I am admitting and do so admit I have committed the conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the
crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered.
15. Se v entiendo que al declararme culpable renuncio a los derecho> legales > constitucionales
enumerados en los parratos anteriores. Tambien ^e que al dar entrada a tal declaration!es). admito que he
cometido la conducta que se alega \ que soy culpable del delitoi M por el cual se da entrada a mi declaration!es).

14. My plea(s) of guilty (is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain between myself and the
prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties, and provisions of this plea bargain, if any are fully
contained in this statement:
14. Mi declaracion de culpabilidad (es) (no es) el resultado de un convenio delaratorio entre el
abogado acusador y yo. Las promesas, obligaciones y estipulaciones de este convenio declaratorio, si existen
algunas, se encuentran en si totalidad en este documento.
15. I know and understand that any motion to withdraw my plea(s) of guilty must be for good
cause, in writing, and must be filed within thirty (30) days after entry of my guilty plea.
15. Se y entiendo que cualquier peticion para retirar mi declaracion* es) de culpabilidad ha de
interponerse dentro de treita (30) dias despues de dar entrada a dicha declaracion(es), y esto ha de ser por
escrito. y debe existir causa justaficada.
16. I know that any charge or sentencing concession, or recommendation of probation or
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney, is not binding on the Judge. I also know that any opinions
they express to me as to what they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court.
16. Se que el Juez no tiene que regirse por cualquier concesion de cargo o de pena. o recomendacion
de libertad condicional probatona o pena suspendida. incluyendo una reduccion de los cargos para la imop^icion
de la pena hecha o solicitada por el abogado defensor o el abogado acusador. Tambien se que el Juez tampoco
tiene que regirse por cualquier opinion que me expresen en cuanto a lo que ellos crean que pueda hacer el Juez.
17. Not threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind has been made to induce me to plead
guilty, and not promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
17. No se me ha amenazado, coaccionado, o influenciado ilegalmente para inducirme a declararme
culpable, y no se me ha hecho ninguna promesa excepto las contenidas en este documento.
18. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand
its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. I do not
wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct.
18. He leido este documento. o mi abogado me lo ha lefdo. y entiendo sus estipulaciones. Se que
puedo cambiar o tachar cualquier cosa contenida en este documento. No deseo hacer ningiin cambio porque
todas las afirmaciones son correctas.
19. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
19. Estoy satisfecho con el asesoramiento v la ayuda de mi abogado.
20. I am
years of age; I have attended school through the
grade; and I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided
to me. I was not under the infuence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my
judgement when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the influence of any
drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgement.
/
20. Tengo / Q anos de edad. he asistido a la escuela hasta el C(? grado y puedo leer y entender
espariol. Si no entiendo ingles, se me ha proporcionado un interprete. No estaba bajo la inrluencia de ninguna
droga, medicamento o bebida alcoholica que pudiera perjudicar mi criterio cuando se tomo la decision de dar
entrada a la declaracion(es). Actualmente no estoy bajo la influencia de ninguna droga. medicamento o bebida
alcoholica que perjudique mi criterio.

-o-

21. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind; mentally capable of understanding the
proceedings and the consequences of ray plea; and free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that
would prevent me from knowingly; intelligently, and voluntarily entering ray plea.
21. Creo estar en sano juicio, con capacidad mental de entender los actos procesales y las
consecuencias de mi declaration, y libre de caulquier enfermedad mental, defecto o impedimento que me
previniera dar entrada a mi declaration a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente.
22. Other:
22. Anadido:

Dated this

Fechado el dia

day of

9 y ^ e » mes

te/Tffifcff-

n :m\uY

de

2*C&/\
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DEFENDANT
ELACUSADO

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
EL CERTIFICADO DEL ABOGADO DEFENSOR
I certify that I am the attorney for \Jj (^fLf^
/L OlJ^)(^A
L. ^ne defendant above, and
that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; and I have discussed it with
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated;
and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing
affidavit, are accurate and true.
Certifico que soy el abogado de
, el antedicho acusado(a). y se
que el (ella) ha leido el documento, o que se lo he leido yo. y lo he discutido con el (ella). y creo que entiende
el sigmficado del contenido en su totalidad, y creo que esta mental y fisicamente competente. A mi leal saber
y entender, despues de una investigacion apropiada. los elementos del delitoi's) y la sinopsis tactual de la
conducta delictiva del acusado estan estipulados correctamente, y estos, junto con las otras proclamaciones y
aiirmaciones hechas por el acusado en el affidavit anterior, son certen^ y verdaderos.

trn,MS /
El Abosada-del Acusado / N d€ Abosacia

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
EL CERTIFICADO DEL ABOGADO ACUSADOR
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's
criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats,
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court.
There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for
the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the
public interest.
Certifico que soy el abogado del Estado de Utah en la causa en contra de
el acusado. He revisado este Documento Declaratorio del Acusado y encuentro que la base factual de ia
conducta delictiva del acusado que constiruye el delito es verdadera y correcta. No se le ha ofrecido al acusado
ningiin incentivo inapropiado, amenaza o coaccion para alentar una declaracion de culpabilidad. Las
negociaciones declaratonas se encuentran en su totalidad en el Documento y en el Convemo Declaratorio. o
como complemento en las actas del tibunal. Existe motivo fundado para creer que la prueba respaldana la
condena del acusado por el delito(s) ante el cual se da entrada a la declaracion(es), y la aceptacion de esta
declaracion(es) beneficiaria a la ciudadanfa.

Prosecuting Attorney / Bar No.
El Abogado Acusador / N de Abosacfa

-5r)<o'

ORDER
LA ORDEN DEL JUEZ
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and
counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is freely and
voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that the defendant's plea(s) of guilty to the charge(s) set forth in
the Statement be accepted and entered.
Basado en los hechos presentados en el Documento anterior y la certificacion del acusado y de los
abogados. el Juez atestigua las firmas y deternuna que la declaracion(es) de culpabilidad del acusado se hace
libre y voluntanamente, y asi se ordena que la declaracion(es) de culpabilidad del acusado por el cargoiv)
expuesto en el Documento sea aceptada y asentada.

Dated this dl
Fechado el dia

dav of V^iArA^l^
de

( .
de 20

.

'k^HMJ^^>
STRICT COURT JUDGE
JUEZ DEL TRIBUNAL DEL DISTRITO

-8NOT1CE TO DEFENDANTS LACKING RESIDENCY PAPERS
AVISO A LOS ACUSADOS QUE NO TBENEN DOCUMENTOS DE RESIDENCIA

I further understand that if I am in this country illegally, I am subject to deportation by the
Department of Immigration and Naturalization Service. Further that if I am an alien with legal resident
status, my staiis may be revoked and I could be subject to deportation.
Ademas entiendo que si estoy ilegal en este pais, estoy sujeto a ser deportado por el Departamento de
Inmigracion y Naturalizacion. Por otra parte, si soy un extanjero con un estado de residencia legal, mi estado
puede ser revocado y puedo ser deportado.
I further understand that if convicted and deported and I re-enter illegally I am subject to
prosecution in the federal courts for illegal re-entry if the conviction was a misdemeanor. If the
conviction was for a felony or a Class A misdemeanor it can be aggravated re-entry.
Ademas entiendo que si se me condena y deporta por un delito menoir y regreso ilegalmente, estoy
sujeto a ser procesado en el tribunal federal por reingreso ilegal. Si la condena fue por un delito mayor o por
un delito menor de clase A, puedo ser procesado por reingreso ilegal con agravantes.

ADDENDUM B
Notice of Appeal

Joseph Jardine # 8889
JARDINE LAW OFFICES
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 350-3506
Telefax: (801)534-1948

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEP
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v..
VICTOR MANUEL RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Case No. 011901224
Judge: Judith S. Atherton
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plain error to reach an issue over which it has no
jurisdiction.
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HOWE, Chief Justice.

After defendant pled guilty, he filed pro se motion to
correct an illegal or improper sentence. The Second
District Court, Davis County, Jon M. Memmott, J.,
denied motion. Defendant appealed. The Supreme
Court, Howe, C.J., held that: (1) defendant waived
issue of trial court's denial of motion, and (2) trial
court lacked jurisdiction to address issue of whether
trial court, in accepting his plea, had failed to strictly
comply with rule governing pleas.
Appeal dismissed.

*1 H 1 In 1991, defendant Javier E. Reyes was
charged with rape of a child, and sodomy of a child,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-402.1,- 403.1
(1999). Pursuant to a plea bargain, he pled guilty to
the charge of rape of a child and the court dismissed
the sodomy charge. He was sentenced to a term of
fifteen years to life and began his incarceration. At no
time since has he sought to withdraw his guilty plea.
On January 26, 1999, he filed a pro se motion under
rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to
correct an illegal or improper sentence. The trial
court denied the motion.

West Headnotes
[11 Criminal Law <S=>1130(2)
1 lOkl 130(2) Most Cited Cases
[11 Criminal Law <£=> 1178
HOkl 178 Most Cited Cases
By failing to address trial court's denial of his pro se
motion to correct an illegal or improper sentence in
his brief or at oral argument, defendant therefore
waived the issue on appeal. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule
22(e).
[21 Criminal Law <®=> 1026.10(3)
110k 1026.10(3) Most Cited Cases
Because defendant did not move to withdraw his
guilty plea within 30 days after the entry of the plea,
appellate court, on appeal of denial of motion to
correct illegal or improper sentence, lacked
jurisdiction to address the issue of whether trial court,
in originally accepting defendant's plea, had failed to
strictly comply with rule governing pleas. U.C.A.
1953, 77-13-6; Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 11, 22(e).
[3] Criminal Law <£=>1030(1)
110k 1030( 1) Most Cited Cases
Appellate court may choose to review an issue not
properly preserved for plain error, but it cannot use

[1] H 2 Reyes now appears before us, ostensibly to
appeal the trial court's denial of his pro se motion
pursuant to rule 22(e). However, he has not addressed
the court's denial of his motion in his brief or at oral
argument, and therefore waives the issue. DeBry v.
Cascade Enters., 935 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1997).'
[2] 1| 3 Instead of focusing on the denial of his rule
22(e) motion, Reyes attacks his guilty plea, arguing
that the trial court committed plain error by failing to
strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. We decline to address this issue
because we do not have jurisdiction to address it.
Section 77-13-6 of the Utah Code was amended in
1989 to require a defendant to file a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea within thirty days after the
entry of the plea. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999).
We have held that failure to do so extinguishes a
defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty
plea on appeal. See State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993,
995 (Utah 1993) (noting that "the plea statute limits a
defendant's right to withdraw his or her guilty plea to
thirty days after entry of the plea" and that
"[thereafter, the right is extinguished"): State v.
Ostler, 2001 UT 68^11 10, 31 P.3d 528 (noting that
"because State v Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067
(Utah 1993), requires a defendant to move for a
withdrawal in the district court before he can
challenge a plea on appeal, his appeal rights on the
plea question could be cut off"). Accordingly,

Copr. £ West 2002 No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works

2002 WL 91642
(Cite as: 2002 \\ L 91642, *1 (I tah))
because Reves did not move to withdraw his guiltv
plea within thirty days after the entry of the plea, we
lack jurisdiction to address the issue on appeal
[3] wt 4 Reyes nonetheless argues that under State \
Man in 964 P 2d 313, 318~(Utah 1998), we can
review a guilty plea, regardless of whether a motion
to withdraw the plea was filed, if plain error or
exceptional circumstances exist In making this
argument, Reyes overlooks the fact that we decided
Mmi in using the pre-amendment version of section
77-13-6, under which the filing of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea was an issue of preservation,
not, as is now the case, an issue of jurisdiction
Marvin 964 P 2d at 318 This court may choose to
review an issue not properly preserved for plain error
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See State \ Holgate 2000 I T 74 «1 11. 10 P 3d 346
It cannot, however, use plain error to reach an issue
over which it has no jurisdiction
*2 * 5 We therefore dismiss Reves' appeal This
court does not have jurisdiction to entertain Reves'
rule 11 arguments Further, bv failing to address on
appeal the denial of his rule 22(e) motion, he has
waived consideration of that issue
<| 6 Associate Chief Justice RUSSON, Justice
DURHAM, Justice DURRANT, and Justice
WILKINS concur in Chief Justice HOWE'S opinion
END OF DOCUMENT
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